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ABSTRACT: I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of 
spoilers.  In single-office elections, a “classic” spoiler turns a winner into a non-
winner and a non-winner into a winner.  Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office 
elections.  In such elections, spoilers include a “Kingmaker”, who turns a non-winner
into a winner; a “Kingslayer”, who turns a winner into a non-winner; a 
“Valuegobbler”, who subtracts from some competitor more seats than it receives; 
and “Selfspoilers”, who may be hurt by competing separately rather than creating 
an electoral coalition. Various strategic spoilers, such as fake parties, are possible 
as well.  I look for spoilers in eight Polish parliamentary elections that have taken 
place since the fall of communism in 1989.  In two elections, the consequences of 
spoilers were massive.  In 1993, multiple spoilers on the right helped the two post-
communist parties return to power, slow down decommunization and create strong 
institutional obstacles to further democratization.  In 2015, a spoiler manufactured a
majority for the largest party (PiS) and, as a consequence, enabled PiS quickly to 
implement radical reforms.  In other elections, spoilers had smaller, but noticeable 
consequences.  The results suggest that parliamentary elections using PR party-list 
systems are vulnerable to spoiler problems that may cause significant political 
effects.





The spoiler effect is one of the nastiest threats identified in single-office 
elections conducted under plurality rule (first-past-the-post) or similar voting 
methods.1  In this paper, I am looking for spoilers in multi-office elections, 
especially under proportional representation (PR) voting systems.  I introduce
a general formal framework for spoiler-like activities in such systems.  Then I
analyze all eight Polish parliamentary elections held after the fall of 
communism in 1989.  In two of those elections, spoilers produced massive 
political consequences.
In single-office parliamentary elections, the spoiling mechanism is simple.  
Two or more similar competitors may play Chicken and refuse to make way 
for the rival.  As a result, they split the vote and lose, turning another party 
into a victor.  Under a slightly different scenario, a small competitor may 
subtract enough votes from a prospective winner to make him a loser.  In 
general, a spoiler in single-office elections is a non-winning alternative whose
removal from the race alters the election result.  The political consequences 
of spoilers include political turmoil, instability or, in the worst-case scenario, 
violent takeovers of power. 
A spoiler decisively affected the 2000 American presidential race.  Ralph 
Nader collected just 2.74% of the vote nationwide and that share was 
sufficient to help George W. Bush narrowly defeat Albert Gore.  While 
Nader’s voters were more centrist than Nader, their estimated distribution of
second preferences was 40% for Bush and 60% for Gore.  That 20-point 
1 The plurality method does poorly in simulations testing its robustness against the spoiler 
problem.  Other majoritarian methods, such as majority runoff and instant-runoff voting 
(IRV), also get low scores (Dougherty and Edward 2011, p. 93).
2
preference for Gore would have given him a victory in the crucial State of 
Florida and, consequently, the majority of electoral votes (Herron and Lewis 
2007).  Since in the United States most of presidential electors are elected 
with plurality rule, the process increasingly becomes vulnerable to spoilers 
when voters are more willing to vote for third parties (Shugart 2004). 
Spoilers have caused considerable turbulence in world politics as well. The 
1970 Chilean election was one of the defining moments of the Cold War.  A 
center-right Jorge Alessandri and a centrist Radomiro Tomic split the vote 
and helped the likely Condorcet loser, Salvador Allende, win the presidency 
(Nohlen 2005).  The tensions resulting from the election of a president with a
radical Marxist agenda, but relatively low popular support, led to 1973 coup 
d’état by General Pinochet.  Another likely beneficiary of the spoiler effect 
was Peru’s Haya de la Torre in 1962, who narrowly defeated two candidates. 
In that and other Latin American cases of weak presidents elected by a faulty
voting method, military coups followed (Colomer 2006).
Except for presidential elections, spectacular examples of massive spoilers in
single-member district (SMD) elections are hard to find.  Even the highest 
profile cases have limited nationwide consequences (e.g., Brams and 
Fishburn 1978).  The frequency of possible spoilers in American general 
election races is estimated at no more than 1.5% (Bump 2014).  The spoiling 
effect does not seem to affect parliamentary SMD elections the same way it 
affects presidential elections.  That observation is quite in line with the 
following intuition.  If infrequent spoilers affect the two main parties with 
similar probabilities, then the expected distributions of seats with or without 
spoilers are close.  One can argue that substantial nation-level spoiler effect 
in SMD parliamentary elections normally would require the simultaneous 
occurrence of highly correlated spoilers in many districts.  Hence, unless an 
unlikely massive third-party spoiler enters elections and generates the 
correlation, the spoiler effect fails to be significant in an SMD parliamentary 
system. 
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In contrast to the lack of serious spoilers in SMD parliamentary races, the 
consequences of splitting votes may complicate parliamentary PR party list 
elections in fundamental ways.  Below, I develop the formal framework 
necessary for analyzing spoilers in multiple winner elections and provide an 
accounting of the turbulences created by spoilers in Polish politics after the 
fall of communism in 1989.  The next section introduces the model and 
several types of spoilers.  The first case describes how multiple simultaneous
spoilers in the 1993 elections helped to bring post-communist parties back to
power. That ‘red shift’ in Polish politics slowed down decommunization and 
created strong institutional obstacles to democratization. Then, I analyze 
how a small spoiler in the most recent 2015 parliamentary elections 
manufactured a majority for the largest center-right party (PiS)2 and, as a 
consequence, enabled PiS quickly to implement radical reforms.  Both 
sections include separate subsections containing detailed narratives on the 
political consequences of 1993 and 2015 spoilers; readers less interested in 
the intricacies of Polish politics can skip those subsections.  Section 5 
reviews how Polish politicians tried to use spoilers strategically.  All cases 
having relatively minor consequences are relegated to Section 6.  The last 
section concludes.
2 The model
The existence of spoilers is closely related to the condition of Independence 
of the Alternative Set (IAS), introduced formally by Heckelman and Chen 
(2013) for probabilistic voting with multiple winners as a property of voting 
methods.  IAS in the context of single-office elections demands that adding 
more alternatives doesn’t turn a non-winner into a winner and subtracting 
alternatives doesn’t turn a winner into a non-winner (Ray 1973; Heckelman 
2 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice). For acronyms of major parties and electoral 
coalitions, see the Appendix.
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2015, p. 275).  The existence of a spoiler implies that a voting method 
violates IAS.
The IAS imposes a very strong requirement on voting rules; practically all 
such rules violate it (Heckelman and Chen 2013, p. 111; Heckelman 2015).  
My focus here is on specific violations of IAS, i.e., the existence of spoilers, 
under distributions of votes in specific elections and specific sets of 
competitors.  A voting rule may violate IAS in general, but such a violation 
may not arise for specific elections and a set of competitors.  Thus, I will look
for definitions that impose weaker conditions than the IAS.  
The framework developed below is applicable both to single-office and 
multiple-winner elections.  The model conceptualizes voting outcomes 
differently than models utilizing voter preferences and voting rules.
The model includes the set of at least three actual electoral committees P1, 
…, Pn, such that Pi  Pj =  for all i, j, subject to i  j.  P = {P1, …, Pn}  is 
called the actual election structure.3  We interpret P as the set of actual 
competitors in presidential or parliamentary elections.  Any set Sm = Pj  Pk  
… that includes no more than n-1 committees from P is interpreted as an 
electoral coalition of Pj, Pk,… and also is called a committee. The 
counterfactual election results in which we are interested are represented by
various committee structures related to P.  Set S is an election structure (or 
simply a structure) if it contains at least two committees; all committees in S
must be pairwisely disjoint, i.e., for any Si, Sj  S, i  j, Si  Sj = .  We 
interpret S as the modified actual structure P such that some committees 
withdrew or formed electoral coalitions.  For instance, P – {Pi} denotes 
structure P when committee Pi withdrew.  The assumption that all structures 
include at least two committees represents our lack of interest in an election 
with only one competitor.
3 The model is based on a generalized partition function form game (Thrall 1962; Kaminski 
2001). For notational reasons, it is substantially easier to introduce elements of P as sets.
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For every structure S = {S1, …, Sm}, we define the seat payoff function sS = 
(sS1, …, sSm), which assigns payoffs to committees 1, …, m such that sSi  0 
and isSi = 100.  We interpret sS as the vector of election results 
(percentages of seats won) when the structure is S.  In the special case of S 
= P, sP represents the vector of actual election results. All committees win 
non-negative percentages of seats that sum to 100. We also assume for 
simplicity that no ties arise in competition for any seat or between the 
largest committees.  If needed, that assumption can be modified; the reward 
for such tiny loss in generality is avoiding substantial complexity.  With no 
ties, in single-office election for every S exactly one i exists such that sSi = 
100 and for all other j, sSj = 0. 
Developing useful and intuitive definitions of spoilers for specific election 
results is challenging.  The intuition behind the “exchanging the winners” 
idea of IAS for single office elections means that two big parties must exist in
order to produce the violation.  The first party would win more than 50% 
seats in an actual election and the second party would also win more than 
50% seats if the spoiler were removed.  Such situations – two big parties – 
practically do not happen in PR elections, where typically a few medium-size 
parties compete, and even the largest party falls short of a majority.  On the 
other hand, the broadest potential definition of IAS for multiple winners, 
which would designate as a spoiler any party that even slightly changes the 
distribution of seats, is too comprehensive for empirical usefulness (see 
Kaminski 2015, pp. 378-379 for discussion).  In addition, in parliamentary 
elections, especially PR elections, a meaningful complication is that parties 
may form electoral coalitions that work in ways analogous to spoilers.  
Given those complications, I will define several types of spoilers, including a 
classic spoiler that is derived directly from the IAS condition.  The definitions 
below identify such types.  The categories are not disjoint, i.e., a spoiler may 
belong to two or more categories.  In most cases, we clearly can identify the 
spoiler’s victim and/or its beneficiary (whose payoffs go down and up, 
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respectively, when the spoiler participates in the election).  In a slightly 
differently defined case of selfspoiling, selfspoilers also are victims.  
Classic spoiler:  Pi is a classic spoiler if for a structure S = P – {Pi}, there 
exist j and k (j  k, k  i, i  j), such that (i) sSj > 50 & (ii) sPk > 50.
A classic spoiler turns the majority winner Pk into a loser and a loser Pj into 
the majority winner.  Since for single-office elections the payoff is either 100 
or 0, the conditions can be rewritten as (i) sSj = 100 and (ii) sPk = 100.  The 
existence of a classic spoiler implies that IAS is violated.
Example: In the already discussed case of the 2000 American presidential 
election, P = {B, G, N}.  The election result is sP = (100, 0, 0). For structure 
S = P – {N} = {B, G}, it is estimated that sSG = 100 and sPB = 100 (Herron 
and Lewis 2007).  Thus, N is a classic spoiler, G is N’s victim and B is N’s 
beneficiary.
As I have noted, it is virtually impossible to find a classic spoiler in PR 
elections.  Nevertheless, other situations closely match our intuition of a 
spoiler.  The next two definitions relax the conditions for a classic spoiler.
Kingmaker:  Pi is a kingmaker if for structure S = P – {Pi}, there exists j  i, 
such that sSj  50 and sPj > 50. 
A kingmaker increases its beneficiary’s payoff from no more than 50 to a 
majority.  In single-office election, except possibly for some empirically rare 
cases of ties, e.g., sSj = 50, a kingmaker must be classic.  Section 4 discusses
the case of the 2015 Polish parliamentary election when a kingmaker is not 
classic even with no ties present.
Kingslayer:  Pi is a kingslayer if for structure S = P – {Pi}, there exists j  i, 
such that sSj > 50 and sPj + sPi  50. 
When a kingslayer competes, the former majority winner doesn’t achieve the
majority even with the kingslayer’s payoff added.  In single-office elections, 
similarly to a kingmaker, with no ties, a kingslayer must be classic.  In 
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general, i.e., with single- or multi-seat elections, a spoiler who is both a 
kingmaker and kingslayer must be classic.
Whenever entry by a new committee causes the loss of a winner or the 
victory of a former non-winner, the political consequences are significant by 
definition.  In the concepts introduced below, no losing or gaining of a 
majority is postulated.  The types of spoilers defined below are specific to PR 
systems.  Their political effects may in some cases be negligible, and in 
some other cases profound.  Their importance certainly affects whether such
spoilers are of our interest. 
Valuegobbler:  Pi is a valuegobbler if for structure S = P – {Pi}, there exists j 
 i, such that sSj > sPj + sPi. 
A valuegobbler probably is the most common spoiler in parliamentary PR 
systems.  A valuegobbler’s entry into the competition reduces the payoff of 
another committee by more than the valuegobbler’s own payoff.  That 
outcome creates an apparent ex post inefficiency since the victim could 
‘bribe’ the valuegobbler not to enter the elections if the seats were 
transferable.  A kingslayer is a special case of a valuegobbler when the 
victimized committee loses its majority of seats.  Of course, since the total 
payoff of all committees is constant, some other committee or committees 
must exist that benefit from the valuegobbler’s entry.
The next type of spoiler conceptualizes the situation in which more than two 
committees exercise a destructive influence on their own electoral result.
Selfspoilers: At least three committees Pk1, …, Pkm are selfspoilers if for a 
structure S = P – {Pk1} – … – {Pkm}  K, where K = Pk1  Pk2  …  Pkm, sSK > 
sPk1 + sPk2 + sPk3 +….
Selfspoilers compete in the elections separately rather than creating an 
electoral coalition that would generate a higher payoff than the total of 
individual payoffs.  One may hypothesize that all selfspoilers other than Pk1 
are the spoilers for Pk1, and the same property holds for Pk2, Pk3, and so on.  
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That may be the case in some empirical situations, although the assumptions
in our definition do not guarantee it.  However, in real world parliamentary 
elections, a simultaneous withdrawal from the election of several committees
that would benefit only one remaining committee of a similar kind seems 
unrealistic.  With such a withdrawal, the quitters would get nothing, while the
only competing committee would collect a substantial payoff.  The quitters 
have no motivation to forego their take (let’s note, however, that rare 
“selfless” potential valuegobblers occasionally happen, as is documented in 
Section 5).  Instead of quitting, a more realistic solution is that similar 
committees pool their resources and form a single electoral coalition.  They 
then can work out a scheme for sharing the payoff among themselves.
The motivation for the final two types of spoilers lies in their threatening 
potential.  We first need to define the concept of a substructure.  T is a 
substructure of P if, instead of Pi  P, T includes at least two non-empty 
committees Pk, Pk1, …, Pkm that are pairwisely disjoint such that Pi = Pk  Pk1 …
 Pkm.  In words, T would result from P if one committee participating in 
actual elections split into at least two smaller ones.  In the definitions given 
below, sT and sR denote the seat payoff function extended to substructures T 
and R, respectively.
Absorbed spoilers: Let T be a substructure of P with Pi = Pk  Pk1 …  Pkm.  
Then Pk1  …  Pkm are absorbed by Pk if (i) sTk > sTkj for j = 1, …, m, and (ii) 
sTk + sTk1 + … + sTkm < sPi.
Absorbed spoilers are committees smaller than Pk that in the election 
coalesced with Pk.  If the committees competed separately, the sum of their 
payoffs would be smaller than the payoff of their coalition.  Thus, creating 
the coalition prevents the loss of seats.
Spoiler threat power: Let T be a substructure of P with Pi = Pj  Pk, where Pj  
Pk = , and R = T – {Pj}.  Then Pj has spoiler threat power against Pi if sRk < 
sPi.
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Pj, a part of a larger coalition Pi, has spoiler threat power against Pi if, by 
leaving Pi, Pj can reduce Pi’s payoff.  Pj may use its spoiler potential to 
negotiate a larger share of seats for itself within Pi.  Of course, the really 
interesting cases occur when the potential loss of payoff is substantial.
The identification of empirical spoilers relies on counterfactual reasoning.  
We can recognize them only by simulating election results under various 
committee structures that appear in the definitions of spoilers, i.e., by 
estimating the values of payoff vectors sS for structures S that interest us. 
The simulations may rely both on quantitative simulations and qualitative 
estimates.  For all such estimates, both quantitative and qualitative, it is 
useful to apply sensitivity analysis to make sure that our results won’t be 
affected critically by small changes in the assumptions.  Needless to say, the 
most interesting cases arise when small competitors cause huge political 
consequences.
For two quantitative estimates (for the 1993 and 2015 Polish parliamentary 
elections), the simulation methodology for the distribution of seats was 
adopted from Flis et al. (2017).  Flis et al. developed and successfully tested 
empirically a formula for the Jefferson-d’Hondt apportionment algorithm that 
generates excellent estimates of seat distributions with country-level rather 
than district-level data.  The seat share of party i is estimated at si = spi + 
½c(npi – 1), where si is party i’s number of seats, pi is party i’s vote share, s is
the total number of seats, c is the number of electoral districts and n is the 
total number of parties participating in seat allocations.  The first term 
represents an exactly proportional share of seats and the second term 
represents corrections based on district structure and i’s relative vote share. 
The formula generates very close estimates for parliamentary elections using
the Jefferson-d’Hondt algorithm.
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3 The “red shift” of 1993 elections: Sevensome selfspoilers 
In September 1993, a surprising comeback of refurbished and renamed post-
communist parties took place in the Polish Sejm (House) elections.4  The 
main successor of the former communist party, SLD (Alliance of Democratic 
Left), and its earlier “red peasants” puppet party, PSL (Polish Farmers’ 
Party), were ruling Poland again.  While they jointly won 65.9% of seats, their
victory was much less impressive in terms of votes (see Table 1).  What 
catapulted their 35.81% vote share into a seat share almost twice as large 
was the severe fragmentation of the rightist post-Solidarity parties.  
According to our terminology, the seven rightist parties were selfspoilers.  
Five parties just fell under their relevant thresholds and won no seats.  Two 
last-minute entrants who joined the competition only three months before 
the September elections amplified the fragmentation.  Wałęsa’s Bloc (BBWR)
was announced to form and enter the race on June 1, while the Solidarity 
Trade Union declared its entry during its convention on June 25-27.
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The substantial vote of 31.94% for the Right translated into only 8.26% of 
seats. While it is tempting to designate Wałęsa’s Bloc and Solidarity as 
spoilers, any division of the rightist parties into spoilers and their victims 
could be questioned.  All parties competed for a very similar chunk of the 
electorate; that was confirmed later when all of them formed a unified AWS 
(Electoral Action Solidarity) coalition in 1996.  Thus, all rightist parties can be
treated as selfspoilers/victims in a coordination game that is more complex 
than a typical spoiler race wherein voters fail to coordinate on one out of two
4 In 1993, 15 parties and electoral coalitions registered their candidate lists nationwide; six 
parties and two minority committees won seats. Election results cited hereafter come from 
the following sources: M. P. (Monitor Polski) (1991, 1993, 1997), PKW (Państwowa Komisja 
Wyborcza) (2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015).  For the main parameters of the electoral laws, 
see the Appendix.
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(symmetric or asymmetric) options.  In our case, the incoordination 
happened among voters choosing among seven committees.   In that game, 
all competitors at the last minute desperately appealed to the others to 
withdraw from the elections but, obviously, nobody volunteered (Sułek 1995,
p. 114).
The multi-spoiler effect was amplified by the last-minute change in the 
electoral law and a noticeable, even though not decisive, shift to the left in 
the voter preferences.  However, had the Right fully coordinated and 
coalesced into a single entity, the post-communist coalition wouldn’t have 
been formed.  The Right’s share of seats is estimated at 41.7%.  The two 
victorious post-communist parties, facing the unified Right, likely would have
lost their majority with the estimated seat shares of 17.2% (PSL) and 24.8% 
(SLD).  The Right could have formed a cabinet in coalition with the post-
solidarity centrist UD (Democratic Union) which would hold about 10% of 
seats, the party that in fact became its coalition partner in the next 1997 
elections.  A backup option for the two parties would have been the post-
solidarity center-left UP (Labor Union) that would hold about 5.2% of seats.  
Given that for all parties, including even the post-communist PSL, which was 
trying to distance itself from its past, the unified Right was a more attractive 
coalition partner than the then relatively isolated SLD, and would have been 
able to form a successful cabinet.
3.1 A narrative on political consequences of the 1993 selfspoilers. 
The consequences of the “red shift” for the young Polish democracy were 
serious.  Poland initiated the 1989 revolution in the Soviet bloc but, possibly 
paying the frontrunner’s uncertainty fee, it proceeded overly cautiously and 
later became the worst procrastinator in the democratic transition. It was 
one of the last countries to have fully free elections in 1991.  The slow pace 
of change allowed the former communists and secret police to hide archives 
of secret informers, and quickly to install themselves and friends in startup 
businesses.  A symbol of such unequal opportunity became Aleksander 
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Gawronik, a former secret police agent, ranked first on the list of richest 
Poles in 1990 (Wprost 1990).  When premier Rakowski signed the law 
legalizing currency exchange in March 1989, Gawronik at midnight on the 
same day opened a large chain of currency exchange points all over Poland 
and monopolized the market overnight.  When in 1991 the former 
communists and their allies lost their Sejm majority, the pace of demounting 
communist monuments and structures accelerated.  It halted again in 1993.  
After the 1993 elections, when the former communists-turned-social 
democrats came back to power, they stopped, slowed down or reversed 
many democratizing institutional reforms.
The “red shift” helped former communist and secret police businessmen to 
consolidate their positions in commerce and politics by bypassing lustration, 
i.e., the verification of public office holders, clerks, teachers, justices, 
journalists, and so forth, whether they were secret informers or otherwise 
collaborated with the communist regime.  A typical sanction for a positively 
lustrated individual is a public announcement and some restrictions on 
access to public offices. The latecomers to the chain revolutions of 1989, 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, performed swift verifications and opened 
secret archives, making quite clean breaks with communism.  In Poland, the 
communist-designed Constitutional Tribunal blocked a draft of lustration law 
that followed a rough lustration attempt initiated with the so-called 
Macierewicz list.  After the “red shift” and facing a loss in the forthcoming 
1997 elections, the SLD-PSL cabinet prepared its own version of a rather 
light lustration law.  The law attempted preemptively to prevent the 
introduction of a harsher law (Kaminski and Nalepa 2014).  Since the 
members of the communist party rarely were recruited as secret police 
informers, the vast majority of the SLD members were safe under that law.  
The lustration process effectively was blocked (Zybertowicz 2004). 
The main institutional project of the SLD-PSL coalition was a new constitution
that was accepted narrowly in a national referendum on May 25, 1997.  The 
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constitution prolonged the life of the Constitutional Tribunal and allowed the 
SLD-PSL coalition to nominate their justices for long nine-year terms and 
create a solid barrier against future anticommunist cabinets.  The 
constitution was written hastily under political pressure, including the 
expectations that President Wałęsa would be reelected for a second term (he
wasn’t) and that the united rightist AWS would win the 1997 elections (it 
did).  Sloppily written paragraphs generated endless conflicts over the next 
decades.  The constitution didn’t separate the powers of the president and 
the cabinet fully, a failure that quickly became the source of systemic 
conflicts between future presidents and ministers or premiers, including a 
“tough friendship” between President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Premier 
Leszek Miller (both from SLD), a “harsh cohabitation” between Premier 
Donald Tusk (PO, Citizens’ Platform) and President Lech Kaczyński (PiS) and, 
after 2015 elections, conflicts between the PiS-affiliated President Andrzej 
Duda and Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz and Minister of Justice 
Zbigniew Ziobro. Equally importantly, ambiguities in the constitution 
explicitly or implicitly ceded power over institutional details to the 
parliamentary majority.  PO in 2015, and PiS in 2015 and later, happily used 
that opportunity for constitutional engineering, as described in the next 
section.
4 2015 elections: A kingmaker 
In the October 25, 2015, Polish election, for the first time since the fall of 
communism in 1989, a single party PiS won the majority of seats.  A small 
protest leftist party Razem (Together) received 3.62% of the popular vote.  
That seemingly inconsequential result of a party registered only three 
months earlier was of utmost importance for the PiS’s victory.  Razem 
subtracted enough votes from the larger leftist coalition ZL (United Left) to 
hold it just below the 8% threshold required of coalitions.  The failure of ZL to
translate their 7.55% of the vote into seats boosted the performances of 
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other parties.  Thanks to the boost, the culturally conservative, economically 
social democratic PiS won a slim majority of 51.09% of Sejm seats despite 
collecting only 37.58% of votes.  Thus, according to our definition, Razem 
was a kingmaker, but not a classic spoiler since without Razem no 
committee would win the majority.  Without such accidental help, PiS 
wouldn’t have been able to form a cabinet alone (see Table 2).5
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
One may ask a question: why did Razem stay in competition even though its 
chances of passing the threshold were minimal?  (Their actual result of 
3.62% was on the higher side of pre-election estimates.)  One possibility is 
that quitting and asking its followers to vote for ZL in exchange for some 
benefits was a better option.  Also, why didn’t ZL register as a “Citizens’ 
Committee”, which required meeting only a 5% threshold?  The likely 
decisive reasons are of a financial nature.  Both players were incentivized to 
take the risk by the rules of state financing.6  Parties mustering over 3% of 
votes (or 6% for “Coalitions of parties”) were eligible for state financing even
if they wouldn’t make their respective 5% and 8% thresholds.  This rule 
encouraged Razem to run even with a slim chance of passing 5%.  ZL ran as 
a “Coalition of parties” since while “Citizens’ Committees” faced lower 
thresholds, they wouldn’t receive any state financing. 
It is worthy of mentioning that PiS in 2015 absorbed a small valuegobbler PJN
(Poland is Most Important), which in the 2011 election received 2.19% of 
5 Another party, KORWiN (Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope), 
received 4.76% of votes.  A total of 16.61% of votes was cast for parties or coalitions that 
didn’t clear their relevant thresholds. Eight parties and electoral coalitions registered their 
candidate lists in at least half of all districts; five parties and one minority committee won 
seats (PKW 2015).
6 The rules were generous to smaller parties.  Every vote up to 5% was valued at 5.77 PLN 
(Polish Zloty), while every vote over 30% would generate only 0.87 PLN in state subsidy.
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votes.  If a similar vote share were subtracted from PiS’s 37.58%, PiS’s seat 
share would have fallen below 50%.
4.1 A narrative of the political consequences of 2015’s kingmaker 
We first need to outline key aspects of the almost-revolutionary policies of 
the post-2015 PiS cabinet.  Winning the Sejm majority, along with the Senate
and the presidency, allowed PiS to introduce a combination of policies that 
intended both to complete the unfinished anticommunist revolution of 1989 
and empower the losers from democratic transformation. The wide-ranging 
array of reforms and restorations of old rules included PiS’s flagship poverty-
fighting and demography-boosting social transfers program of monthly 
allowances for a second child, called 500+, and lifting the minimum wage 
even above the trade union’s demands.  PiS restored the old two-tiered 
educational system, raised the compulsory education age from 6 to 7 years, 
and reinstated the previous retirement age (60 years for women and 65 
years for men rather than 67 years for both sexes).  Successful programs for 
fighting tax fraud, including the omnipresent VAT fraud, helped to keep the 
budget under control despite the rise in social spending.  Other changes 
included a bank tax, a progressive turnover retail trade tax (contested by the
European Commission), lowering the pensions for former communist secret 
police to the average pension, and removing from public space the remnants
of communism, such as the monuments of the Soviet Red Army. 
The judiciary experienced the most controversial makeover.7  The motivation
for change was the judicial system’s inefficiency and lack of reforms after the
fall of communism.  The system of checks and balances among the three 
branches of government offered virtually no checks of the executive and 
legislative branches on the judiciary. For instance, the Sejm could reject a 
Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling with a two-thirds supermajority at the 
7 The highest judicial power in Poland is fragmented into a Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), 
a Chief Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny), a Constitutional Tribunal 
(Trybunał Konstytucyjny) and a National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada 
Sądownictwa); some power is ceded to other bodies (Konstytucja RP 1997, Chapters 8 and 
9).  
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Tribunal’s birth in 1982, but the new 1997 constitution removed any veto 
power from the legislative branch.  The judicial profession controlled the 25-
person National Council for the Judiciary, whose duties included selecting the
93 Supreme Court and other justices.  The parliament or the president 
practically had no power over the selection of any justices.  Additionally, the 
system inherited many communist judges who presided over political trials 
before 1989.  The first non-communist President of Supreme Court and a 
vocal critic of PiS’s reforms, Adam Strzembosz, famously opined that the 
judiciary would cleanse itself of such people.  He acknowledged later that he 
was wrong. 
The deep reforms were illustrated with facts describing the judicial branch’s 
inefficiency.  Some inmates waited several years for trials and some convicts
waited up to 14 years for their places in prison (see Adamski 2012; Karłowski
et al. 2013).  Massive scandals involving judicial and prosecutorial 
participation or puzzling inactivity included the 2012 Amber Gold Ponzi 
scheme, which claimed more than 11,000 victims (Komisja Śledcza 2017) 
and a real-estate restitution outrage involving about 40,000 tenants in 
Warsaw being evicted by re-privatization mafias (see Śpiewak 2017).  In 
2010, spending on the judicial system was about 0.85% of general 
government expenses, while the median for all EU countries was 0.4% 
(Dubois et al. 2013, p. 424).8
The legislation introduced by PiS in 2016 and 2017 intended to transfer some
control functions over judicial bodies to the parliament and the public.  The 
loopholes in the hastily written 1997 Constitution included many loose 
provisions delegating certain law-making power to the House majority.  
Those powers included determining the structure, scope and procedures of 
the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court, as well as setting the 
8 In June 2017, only 28% of the respondents held a positive opinion on the court system 
while 49% held a negative opinion (CBOS 2017, p. 2).  On July, 26-28, 2017, 81% of 
respondents believed that the judiciary required reforms, while 14% had an opposite opinion
(Ipsos Observer 2017).  The support for specific reforms proposed by PiS typically was lower 
and depended on the wording of questions.
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retirement age for justices (Konstytucja RP 1997, Art. 176, Art. 187.4, Art. 
197, Art. 180.4).  The Constitution failed to specify who actually selects the 
15 members of the National Council for the Judiciary from the pool of all 
sitting justices (Konstytucja RP 1997, Art. 187.1.2).  The PiS legislators 
meticulously used those imprecisions for constitutional engineering, even 
though they didn’t have the 66 2/3% supermajority necessary for 
constitutional amendments.
By winning the majority of House seats, PiS could form a single-party 
cabinet.  Without the kingmaker, PiS would have had to look for a coalition 
partner. The only realistic partner was the center-right Kukiz ’15 
commanding 42 seats, which probably would have gone down to 38-40 seats
if ZL had passed the threshold.  
Except for fighting tax fraud and removing the remnants of communism, the 
potential coalitional partner was less radical than PiS on political reforms and
was closer to the dovish wing of PiS with President Duda.  For instance, Kukiz
’15 supported the president’s bill for the House to elect 15 justices to the 
National Council for the Judiciary with a 60% supermajority instead of the 
initial 50% majority proposed by PiS.  The principal programmatic objective 
of Kukiz ’15 was to substitute the PR electoral system with SMDs and 
plurality.  When PiS proposed the elimination of SMDs in the local 
government elections in November 2017, Kukiz ’15 reacted with fury.  Its 
leader threatened street demonstrations, and even called PiS a Bolshevik 
party (Kukiz 2017).  In short, the revolutionary program implemented by PiS 
would have been substantially tamed under the hypothetical PiS-Kukiz ’15 
coalition.
As an obvious consequence of a less radical program, the political 
polarization in Poland that generated the opposition’s dramatic accusations 
that PiS is “destroying democracy” and “breaking the rule of law” would 
have been lessened.  The street demonstrations against PiS, organized in 
2015 and 2016 by the opposition and its allies would have been less 
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vigorous.  The clash with the European Commission that led its First Vice-
President Frans Timmermans to trigger the ‘nuclear option’ of Article 7.1 on 
December 20, 2017, would probably have been avoided. 
5 Strategic moves: Valuegobblers, threats and absorbed spoilers
The spoiling effect may be used strategically.  It may materialize in 
surprisingly ingenious ways: as a fake party subtracting votes from the 
competition or as a tiny group of spoilers that increase the manipulator’s 
own vote share.  All such cases fulfill our definition of valuegobbler.  A 
prospective spoiler can threaten coalition partners.  A spoiling strategy also 
may be used against individual candidates from one’s own party competing 
on the same party list.9
The undisputed master of strategic spoiling was Adam Słomka, a leader of 
KPN.  His spoiling attempts often exploited relative voter ignorance about the
identities of favored parties.  He created clones that would confuse the 
voters into splitting votes between his clone and the original party.  Later, he
created spoiler threats against allied parties in order to extract payoffs in 
exchange for not launching the spoiler.  His successes suggest that emerging
democracies may be particularly vulnerable to clones, a special type of 
spoilers violating the criterion of Independence of Clones (Tideman 1987).
Słomka’s long spoiling career began with the first free elections in 1991, 
which used Webster-Sainte-Laguë formula in large districts and no 
thresholds.10  The total number of registered electoral committees was 
incredibly high at 111 and the Laakso-Taagepera’s effective number of 
parliamentary parties was 10.91 (see Laakso-Taagepera 1979).  Such a 
setting – with an electoral formula friendly towards smaller parties – is 
extremely challenging for a spoiler.  Nevertheless, Słomka creatively used 
9 In regional legislative elections in Russia the strategic use of spoilers brought only modest 
results (Golosov 2015).
10 Webster-Sainte-Laguë formula is a divisor method based on consecutive odd numbers.
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the property of the electoral law called apparentement.  It enabled parties to
combine their votes into a partisan ‘bloc.’  Seats were assigned on the basis 
of the total combined vote.  Under apparentement, a small party for which 
votes otherwise would be wasted actually could win parliamentary seats.  
Słomka’s idea was to introduce plankton of micro-valuegobbler parties that 
his supporters carefully planted in various corners of the ideological space. 
The plankton included a party related to the Polish ethnic minority 
association in Germany, a farmer’s party, a green party and a feminist 
party.11  The four tiny valuegobblers subtracted 1.4% of votes from similar 
competitors.  The KPN was rewarded for absorbing the plankton with seven 
extra seats. 
Słomka’s next spoiling attempt was even more sophisticated, but less 
successful.  In 1993, he created a clone of a post-Solidarity center-left Unia 
Pracy (Labor Union) and called it Polska Unia Pracujących (Polish Union of 
Laborers).  He endowed his clone with leaders having names identical to 
those of the UP’s original heads (Zbigniew Bujak and Wiesława Ziółkowska).  
The intended spoiler PUP failed to subtract a substantial vote from UP by 
receiving only 0.05% of votes against UP’s original 7.28%.  The likely lesson 
for Słomka was that an acronym looking similar to the original might be more
important than time-consumingly cloning the leaders’ names.
The 1997 elections witnessed a festival of spoilers and spoiler threats when 
the fragmented Right consolidated into a grand coalition (AWS), plausibly 
interpreted as former selfspoilers being absorbed by the dominant trade 
union Solidarity.  Słomka, a member of the AWS, achieved considerable 
success with a mini valuegobbler.  The post-communist SLD created a 
puppet KPEiR (National Party of Pensioners and Retired) party with polling 
scores oscillating around 6%-7% of votes.  Two months before the elections, 
Słomka torpedoed the chances of the KPEiR by creating its clone named 
KPEiR RP (National Agreement of Pensioners and Retired of the Republic of 
11 Polski Związek Zachodni, Blok Ludowo-Chrześcijański, Polska Partia Ekologiczna-Zielonych 
and Sojusz Kobiet Przeciw Trudnościom Życia. 
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Poland). In the election, the spoiler KPEiR RP almost perfectly confused the 
original party’s electorate and received 1.63% of votes against KPEiR’s 
2.18%.  Neither reached the 5% threshold required for receiving seats.  
Another valuegobbler for the post-communist SLD that didn’t make the 
threshold was a center-left UP with 4.74% of the vote.  If KPEiR hadn’t been 
neutralized and UP hadn’t run, the SLD’s 35.65% seat-share yield could have 
been closer to the 43.70% of the winner AWS.  However, given the relatively 
strong results of AWS’s prospective coalition partners UW (Freedom Union) 
and ROP, the AWS would have been able to form a coalitional cabinet 
anyway.
Just before the 1997 elections, Słomka skillfully used the spoiling threat 
power of his own KPN party.  He blackmailed the AWS’s leadership, warning 
that KPN would leave the coalition and coalesce with four smaller parties.  He
claimed that “there would be a chance of passing the 5% threshold by such a
committee.  However, those 7-8% votes won by us would mean 10-15% 
fewer votes for the AWS” (Zdort 1997).  Creating such a significant spoiler 
could have helped the AWS’s chief opponent SLD win the elections.  After 
receiving some political compensation from the AWS, Słomka backed down.  
Other spoiler threats within the AWS coalition also resulted in concessions 
being made by the AWS leadership, but they didn’t break the coalition.  
Finally, Słomka’s party KPN broke into two parts before the elections.  KPN-
PPP left the AWS coalition, but in face of a certain electoral defeat, decided 
altruistically to withdraw from the elections because of its own spoiler 
potential.  The selfless spoiler-to-be asked its voters to vote for the AWS 
since “The polls didn’t give us any chances for passing the 5% threshold.  
The precious votes for us wouldn’t have been converted into seats” (KMIL 
1997).
Later, Słomka’s attempts at strategic spoiling were still imaginative, but less 
successful.  In 2001, he attended the inaugural convention of a large new 
party that promised to reveal its name.  When he learned the name, he 
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quickly went to the relevant office to register the name Platforma 
Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform, PO).  The actual Platforma’s leaders were 
surprised a few hours later to learn that their original name was taken and 
had to change the name formally into Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczpospolitej
Polskiej (Citizen’s Platform of the Polish Republic).  In 2005, Słomka 
registered Liga Patriotycznych Rodzin (League of Patriotic Families) with the 
identical acronym LPR as the original party’s Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of 
Polish Families).  In both cases, he was unable to turn those spoiler ideas into
actual ones.
The final example goes beyond party competition.  Internal spoilers can 
materialize only in a PR system with an open list.12 Flis (Flis 2014; Flis and 
Olczyk 2017) argues that for candidates in PR open list elections, internal 
competition, i.e., competing against fellow candidates from the same party, 
is more important than external competition.  He offers an example of an 
outsider PSL candidate in Lublin in Eastern Poland who surprisingly got 
elected to the Sejm while occupying a remote 24th place on his party’s list.  
He clearly was considered by the leadership as one of the unelectable 
dummies lining the list’s bottom.  The local party leadership didn’t like such 
an outcome.  In the next elections, he was placed in a high third position on 
the list, but the leadership added three more candidates from his small 
county to the list.  The spoilers worked as expected and he was not 
reelected.
6 Other elections: Minor valuegobblers
After the tumultuous 1990s, the Poland’s party system consolidated and the 
next elections witnessed fewer paradoxes and less electoral engineering.  
The description below briefly summarizes how spoilers possibly affected 
those four elections.
12 With an open list, voters vote for a candidate or candidates and the seats are assigned 
consecutively according to the numbers of votes.  With a closed list, the vote is for a list only
and the seats are assigned according to candidate positions on the list.  
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In the 2001 election, the poll leader SLD preemptively founded an electoral 
coalition with its 1997 valuegobbler UP.  The rightist AWSP (Electoral Action 
Solidarity of the Right) and centrist UW fell below their respective thresholds,
with 5.60% and 3.10% of votes, and gobbled votes from the center-right 
parties.  Since the SLD-UP won the elections by a large margin with 47% of 
seats, and the results of its two potential coalition partners were strong, with
PSL receiving 9.13% of seats and Samoobrona receiving 11.52% of seats, the
SLD-UP-dominated cabinet would have been formed even if the spoilers 
hadn’t competed.
Two post-solidarity parties, PiS and PO, which took 33.70% and 28.91% of 
seats, respectively, won the 2005 elections.  The cabinet coalition of PiS-LPR-
Samoobrona had a healthy 57.83% of seats, but that outcome was quite 
surprising since for long time the coalition of PO-PiS had been expected to 
form.  Two small valuegobblers, Socjaldemokracja Polska and Partia 
Demokratyczna, with below-threshold votes of 3.89% and 2.45%, subtracted 
some votes from the leftist and centrist parties.  A better score for the 
centrist PO could have strengthened its position in the cabinet negotiations 
with PiS and possibly could have resulted in the formation of a PO-PiS 
cabinet.  
In the early parliamentary elections of 2007, PO decisively won 45.43% of 
seats over the second-place PiS with 32.11% of seats and held jointly with its
coalition partner PSL the majority of 52.17%.  The tandem of former partners
of PiS in the 2005 cabinet, Samoobrona and LPR, ended below the threshold 
with 1.53% and 1.30% of votes, respectively.  Even with the votes of both 
parties added to the PiS vote, PiS likely would have needed 1%-2% of votes 
more in order to push PO-PSL below 50% of seats.  There is some chance 
that a similar number of seats could have been gained if the three parties 
consolidated early and hadn’t run a destructive negative campaign against 
one another.  Thus, the importance of this case is unclear.  Regardless of a 
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slightly better PiS score and a slightly worse PSL result, the centrist PO would
have been able to add another coalition partner if one had been needed.
Finally, the 2011 elections were spoiler-wise close and the existence of 
significant valuegobblers is in doubt.  PO won decisively with 45% of seats 
against PiS’s 34.13% and again formed a cabinet with its coalitional partner 
PSL with just 51.09% of total seats.  The PO-PSL coalition could have been 
borderline vulnerable to the removal of a small valuegobbler Polska Jest 
Najważniejsza (Poland is Most Important), which earlier was a part of PiS and 
in 2015 was re-absorbed by it.  With 2.19% of votes, PJN didn’t reach the 
threshold.  Another valuegobbler was Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement), 
tangled in a Chicken-like competition with the larger leftist party SLD.13 
Nevertheless, PO, as the centrist party in the parliament, wouldn’t have had 
any problems in forming a cabinet coalition, perhaps with a different or 
additional partner.
7 Conclusion
Since at least Balinski and Young’s (1982) seminal volume, we have known 
that PR seat-allocation algorithms are prone to a large number of paradoxes 
and problems.  However, in contrast to single-office elections, the research 
on such problems in PR electoral systems has been pretty scarce.14 The 
results of this paper suggest that at least some PR party-list systems may be 
deeply affected by the spoiler effect, a problem that is endemic in single-
office elections with plurality rule.  Moreover, unlike in single-member district
electoral systems, parliamentary elections with PR systems may witness 
multiple types of spoilers that cause significant turbulence (see Table 3).
13 Flis (2011) discusses two scenarios of potential PiS-PJN and SLD-RP (RP = Palikot’s 
Movement) electoral coalitions or mergers under the assumption of additive votes that 
probably overestimates slightly the total votes of both coalitions.  Under such additive 
scenarios, the total seats of the PO-PSL coalition would fall two and nine seats short of a 
majority, respectively. 
14 For exceptions, see Van Deemen and Vergunst (1998), Tasnádi (2008), Kurrild-Klitgaard 
(2008, 2013) and Miller (2015). Tideman (2015) offers a review of a broader class of 
multiple-winner voting rules.
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Arguably, a strong factor facilitating spoilers are vote thresholds that are 
shared by many PR systems.  If a party hovers just over the threshold, even 
a small valuegobbler may push it under water with zero seats.  Such failure 
benefits the parties that exceed the threshold.  The combination of high 
thresholds with the Jefferson-d’Hondt apportionment algorithm and small 
districts seems to be especially problematic since the latter two factors 
amplify the translation of votes into seats and may magnify the spoiler’s 
political consequences. In a PR system with a nationwide district and no 
thresholds, such as the Netherlands or Israel, the spoiler potential is limited 
because no small alike competitor can push a party below the threshold.  
However, even in a very proportional system that assigns the formateur 
rights to the largest party, a valuegobbler can turn the formateur party into 
the second-largest one, thereby affecting cabinet formation. 
Under favorable conditions, spoilers may be created unintentionally by 
uncertainty about voter preferences paired with failed Chicken or 
coordination games.  Incentives for creating such spoilers may be provided 
by entrepreneurial activity of political newcomers as well as by payoffs other 
than seats, such as party financing that is subject to lower thresholds than 
seats or the publicity associated with participation in election debates.  An 
intentional spoiling threat may be produced on the basis of blackmailing 
opportunities in a larger coalition.  Furthermore, a competitor with a 
sufficient interest, resources and know-how may strategically clone an 
alternative in order to neutralize its rival or create plankton of parties 
providing extra votes. 
The collected evidence suggests that new democracies, with poor 
information about parties and candidates, fluctuating voter preferences, and 
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frequent electoral reforms, may be especially vulnerable to paradoxes and 
unusual election outcomes.  For instance, “red shifts” similar to the Polish 
one happened in other Central-Eastern European countries.  In the 1992 
Lithuanian elections, the ex-communist party won 51.8% of seats with 44% 
of votes; in the 1994 Hungarian elections, the ex-communist party won 
54.1% of seats with 33% of votes (Kaminski et al. 1998). The comeback of 
former communists allowed them to block, slow down or reverse reforms and
create institutional barriers to transitional justice and democratization.  It is 
likely that selfspoilers could be found in both cases. 
Finally, “paradoxical” features of elections may often be conceptualized in 
alternative ways by referring to the effects of electoral institutions rather 
than focusing on political strategies. While Razem was a kingmaker in the 
2015 Polish elections, both lower thresholds and an apportionment algorithm
friendly to smaller parties likely would have prevented PiS from winning the 
majority.15  In 1993, a new electoral formula, smaller districts and thresholds 
dramatically amplified the effects of selfspoilers (Kaminski et al. 1998).  
Likewise, strategic cloning of parties or creating spoiler plankton can be 
prevented with appropriate restrictions in the electoral law. Last, but not 
least, more types of spoilers could be introduced with certain modifications 
of definitions; some spoilers satisfy multiple definitions.  For instance, the 
rightist parties in 1993 could be jointly named the kingmakers for SLD and 
PSL, which jointly won the majority. 
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Appendix
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Acronyms of major parties and coalitions of parties appearing in the article 
follow the format: ACRONYM – Polish Name (English Name) [possibly short 
comment]
AWS – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Electoral Action Solidarity) 
AWSP – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (Electoral Action Solidarity of 
the Right) [successor of AWS]
BBWR – Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (Non-partisan Bloc Supporting 
Reforms)
KORWiN – Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczpospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (Coalition for 
the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope)
KPEiR – Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów (National Party of Pensioners 
and Retired)
KPEiR RP – Krajowe Porozumienie Emerytów i Rencistów Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej (National Alliance of Pensioners and Retired of the Republic of 
Poland) [clone of KPEiR]
KPN – Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of Independent 
Poland)
KPN-OP – KPN Obóz Prawicy (KPN-Camp of the Right) [part of KPN after split]
KPN-PPP – KPN Porozumienie Prawicy Polskiej (KPN-Alliance of Polish Right) 
[part of KPN after split]
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) [successor of Porozumienie 
Centrum]
PJN – Polska Jest Najważniejsza (Poland is Most Important)
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PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform)
PSL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Farmers’ Party)
PSL-PL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Porozumienie Ludowe (Polish Farmers’ 
Party-Farmers’ Alliance) [split from PSL]
ROP – Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for Reconstruction of Poland) 
[successor of 1993 Coalition for Republic]
RP – Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement)
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Alliance of Democratic Left)
UD – Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union)
UP – Unia Pracy (Labor Union)
UW– Unia Wolności (Freedom Union) [successor of UD]
ZL – Zjednoczona Lewica (United Left) [coalition created mostly by SLD]
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Table 1 Votes and seats for the rightist and post-communist parties in the 






Votes Seats Votes Seats
Rightist total 
(selfspoilers/victims)
     PSL-PL
     Coalition for Republic
     Porozumienie Centrum
     Solidarity Trade Union
     BBWR (Wałęsa Bloc)
     KPN
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Note: “United Right” denotes the election structure with seven rightist 
parties creating a unified electoral coalition. The criterion for listing the 
seven rightist parties was their inclusion (some after splits) in the grand 
coalition of the Right called Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) that was formed
on June 8, 1996, after long negotiations.  For the coalitions Fatherland and 
SLD the electoral threshold was 8%; for single parties, it was 5%.16  
16 The simulation methodology adopted from Flis et al. (2017) under the assumption that the
votes for the Right are additive and the remaining votes were unchanged.  The additivity 
assumption seems to be conservative given that three weeks before the elections almost 
one out of three supporters of the Right declared a willingness to vote strategically if faced 
with sure defeat of their favorite party (CBOS 1993, p. 13).  Outside of the rightist bloc, the 
other likely beneficiaries of strategic votes were the post-Solidarity centrist Democratic 
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Union, the post-Solidarity center-left Labor Union and the post-communist PSL.  The 
conservatism of my estimate also is supported by the facts that in the previous 1991 
elections the seven rightist parties from my list received 38.95% of votes, while in the next 
1997 elections the united Right (as AWS) received 33.83% plus 5.56% for a dissenting 
smaller rightist ROP (Movement for Reconstruction of Poland).  Both numbers are more than 
20% higher than my assumed total 1993 support of 31.94%.  The simulation results are in 
very good agreement with the results of Kaminski et al. (1998), who conducted their 
simulation for six parties only, with no KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland). In 1996, 
KPN broke into two factions and only one of them joined the AWS. It was not added to the 
grand coalition considered by Kaminski et al.
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Table 2 Actual and simulated electoral results for the spoiler (Razem), the 
spoiler’s main victim (ZL) and the winner (PiS) in the 2015 Polish 
parliamentary elections (percent). Other parties omitted.
Party
Actual election results Simulated results (Razem
removed)


















Note: The simulation methodology is adopted from Flis et al. (2017) under 
the assumptions that ½ of the Razem’s vote would go to ZL, the remaining 
votes would be divided equally among the three parliamentary center-left 
parties, and the votes of two rightist parties stayed constant.17
17 Second preferences for voters supporting a tiny party like Razem are unavailable. Among 
all voters who intended to vote if their first choice were unavailable, 15.5% indicated ZL as 
their second choice (Millward Brown 2015).  The minimal transfer of votes from Razem to ZL 
necessary to pass the threshold was 0.45% of all election votes, or only about 13% of votes 
for Razem.  Since Razem’s ideological position was close to ZL, even though Razem can be 
considered a “protest party,” one can safely assume that the transfer rate from Razem to ZL
would have been substantially larger than the general population’s 15.5%, which already 
exceeds the 13% minimum.
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spoiler plankton benefitted medium-sized party KPN 
(5)
selfspoilers enabled the consolidation of post-
communism (3)
clone neutralized small party KPEiR, spoiling threats 
to AWS from KPN-OP and others, selfless spoiler KPN-
PPP (5)
potential spoiler UP absorbed by the election winner 
SLD (6)
potential cabinet PO-PiS not formed (6)
tandem of valuegobblers Samoobrona and LPR 
possible (6)
two independent small valuegobblers PJN and RP 
possible (6)
kingmaker enabled single-party cabinet with a 
strong agenda (4)
Note: In eight elections, the following numbers of spoilers were identified: 
one kingmaker, one set of selfspoilers, 14 valuegobblers (four of them being 
quite consequential), two spoiler threats and three absorbed spoilers.
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Note: Size of Sejm: 460 seats.  Abbreviations: " = no change from previous 
election, NL = nationwide list, J-d’H = Jefferson-d’Hondt, H-H-N = Hamilton-
Hare-Niemeyer (largest remainder), mW-S-L = modified Webster-Sainte-
Laguë, P = parties, social/political organizations, and citizen committee’s in 
districts, C = coalitions of parties or social/political organizations in districts, 
M = minority lists in districts
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